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Taking a Step Beyond Maxwell to Tame 
the Doctrine of Equivalents  
Matthew C. Phillips* 
INTRODUCTION 
The doctrine of equivalents creates uncertainty in the scope of 
patent rights, spawns litigation, and clashes with other doctrines of 
patent law, namely the requirement for clarity of notice and the 
provisions for reissue of defective patents.  For these reasons, 
many have attempted to criticize, limit and even abolish the 
doctrine of equivalents.  The doctrine has more or less withstood 
all attacks and is a permanent fixture in patent law for the 
foreseeable future, because it serves an important purpose -- 
bolstering patent protection in circumstances that would otherwise 
undermine the incentive to innovate and disclose technology via 
patenting.   
This paper analyzes the law and policies animating the doctrine 
of equivalents and other patent law doctrines with which it clashes.  
This paper proposes a limitation on the doctrine of equivalents that 
minimizes these clashes in a manner that furthers the goals of the 
patent system while fairly balancing the equitable interests of the 
parties involved.  Part I of the paper provides basic background 
about the doctrine of equivalents.  Part II reviews the tensions 
between the doctrine of equivalents and the notice function of 
claims.  Part III presents reissue proceedings as a preferable 
alternative to the doctrine of equivalents.  Part IV proposes that the 
doctrine of equivalents should be reserved only for after-arising 
technology, with justification based on an extension of the 
dedication rule of Maxwell v. Baker.1  Finally, Part IV contrasts the 
proposals justification from Part IV with other justifications that 
have been advanced in support of the same proposal. 
 
 *  The author is a patent agent and law clerk at Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering in 
Washington, D.C.  Formerly a practicing engineer and a patent examiner, he holds 
bachelor, master and doctorate degrees in electrical engineering from the University of 
Utah.  He will receive the J.D. degree from Georgetown University Law Center in 2001.  
He acknowledges the helpful guidance from adjunct professors Nancy Linck and Scott 
Chambers, for whose course this paper was first prepared. 
 1  Maxwell v. J. Baker Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
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I. THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS IS A JUDICIALLY CREATED 
DOCTRINE THAT EXTENDS THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE BEYOND THE 
LINGUISTIC LIMITS OF A CLAIM 
The doctrine of equivalents is a judicially-created doctrine that 
extends the right to exclude beyond the linguistic limits of a patent 
claim.2  Although the doctrine of equivalents does not extend or 
expand claim scope,3 it does provide patent rights that are different 
from the literal language of the claims.  When there is no literal 
infringement, the doctrine of equivalents is invoked by considering 
the differences between the accused article/process and the literal 
meaning of the claims.4  Generally, if the differences are 
insubstantial, then the accused device/process is said to be 
infringing.5  Various factors are pertinent to the issue of whether 
the differences are substantial.  These factors include known 
interchangeability, the purpose of the different part of the accused 
device, the qualities of the different part of the accused device 
when combined with other parts, and the function that it performs.6  
In particular, a popular test for equivalence of mechanical 
differences is the function-way-result test, by which the differences 
between two things are insubstantial if they perform substantially 
the same function in substantially the same way to achieve the 
same result.7 
Infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is typically 
determined by a jury.  The determination of whether a given part 
of an accused device is insubstantially different from an element of 
a patent claim is a question of fact.8  The fact finder reaches the 
issue of equivalence in fact unless one of the legal doctrines 
described in Part B, infra, precludes infringement under the 
 
 2 See Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assoc., 904 F.2d 677, 684, 
14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1942, 1948 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 3 See id. 
 4 See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 38, 41 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1865, 1875 (1997). 
 5 See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1521-22 
(Fed. Cir. 1995), acq. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 38, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1875. 
 6 See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609, 85 
U.S.P.Q. 328, 330-31 (1950). 
 7 See Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 38, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1875. 
 8 See Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609, 85 U.S.P.Q. at 331.  See also Warner-
Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 37-38, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1874-75. 
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doctrine of equivalents as a matter of law.9 
A. The Rationale for the Doctrine of Equivalents is Preventing 
Competitors From Easily Avoiding Infringement by 
Strengthening Patent Rights and thus Further Encouraging 
Innovation and Disclosure 
The doctrine of equivalents serves an important purpose: 
[C]ourts have also recognized that to permit imitation of a 
patented invention which does not copy every literal 
detail would be to convert the protection of the patent 
grant into a hollow and useless thing.  Such a limitation 
would leave room for  indeed encourage  the 
unscrupulous copyist to make unimportant and 
insubstantial changes and substitutions in the patent 
which, though adding nothing, would be enough to take 
the copied matter outside the claim, and hence outside the 
reach of law.  One who seeks to pirate an invention, like 
one who seeks to pirate a copyrighted book or play, may 
be expected to introduce minor variations to conceal and 
shelter the piracy.  Outright and forthright duplication is a 
dull and very rare type of infringement.  To prohibit no 
other would place the inventor at the mercy of verbalism 
and would be subordinating substance to form.  It would 
deprive him of the benefit of his invention and would 
foster concealment rather than disclosure of inventions, 
which is one of the primary purposes of the patent 
system.10 
 
 
 
 9 See The Honorable Paul R. Michel, Speech of the Honorable Paul R. Michel Given 
to the New Jersey Intellectual Property Law Association, 9 FED. CIR. B.J. 139, 140 
(1999). 
 10 Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609, 85 U.S.P.Q. at 330.  See also Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d 
at 1532 (Newman, J., concurring) (If minor improvements are likely to be captured by 
the doctrine of equivalents, . . . the doctrine of equivalents, like the grant of broad claims, 
could encourage leapfrogging advances instead of minor improvements and substantial 
imitation.). 
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B.  The Doctrine of Equivalents is Limited by Prior Art, 
Prosecution History Estoppel, the All-Elements Rule and 
Public Dedication 
Four doctrines limit application of the doctrine of equivalents.  
First, prior art limits the scope of equivalents to that which is novel 
and nonobvious over the prior art.11  One conceptual method for 
testing whether this limit has been reached, first involves 
construction of a hypothetical claim that would literally cover the 
accused device/process.12  Next, the hypothetical claim is tested for 
patentability in terms of novelty and nonobviousness over the prior 
art.13 
Second, the prosecution history of a patent can limit the doctrine 
of equivalents by estopping a patentee from recapturing, as an 
equivalent, subject matter surrendered during prosecution before 
the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).14  The rationale for 
prosecution history estoppel is that patent examiners and the 
public, by inspection of the prosecution history, reasonably rely 
upon the representation by the patent applicant that subject matter 
is being surrendered.15  At this time, more exact contours of 
prosecution history estoppel are being considered by the Federal 
Circuit in the case of Festo v. SMC.16 
A third limitation on the doctrine of equivalents is the all-
elements rule, which precludes from permissible equivalents 
those that are only equivalent to the claimed invention as a 
whole.17  The all-elements rule forces the equivalence analysis to 
 
 11 See Wilson Sporting Goods, 904 F.2d at 684, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1948-49. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. 
 14 See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. 17, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1865 (1997). 
 15 See Haynes Intl, Inc. v. Jessop Steel Co., 8 F.3d 1573, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d 1652 (Fed. 
Cir. 1993), on rehearing, 15 F.3d 1076, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d 1958 (Fed. Cir. 1994).  See also 
Mark I Marketing Corp. v. R.R. Donnelly & Sons Co., 66 F.3d 285, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d 1095 
(Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 16 See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 187 F.3d 1381, 1382, 
51 U.S.P.Q.2d 1959, 1960 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (withdrawing Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu 
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 172 F.3d 1361, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) 
(rehearing en banc ordered with briefing requested on issues of: (1) whether amendments 
not traversing art rejections create estoppel; (2) whether voluntary amendments create 
estoppel; (3) the range of equivalents available when estoppel is explicitly present; and 
(4) the range of equivalents available when estoppel is presumed.). 
 17 See generally Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 4 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1737 (Fed. Cir. 1987).  See also Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. 17, 41 
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proceed on a more focused, element-by-element basis.  The all-
elements rule has been emphasized by the Supreme Court as an 
important tool for preventing overreaching of the doctrine of 
equivalents.18  Presently, there is uncertainty in the law as to what 
is an element for purposes of this rule.  Festo v. SMC will likely 
address this issue as well.19 
A fourth limitation on the doctrine of equivalents is a limitation 
against recapturing, by equivalents, subject matter that was 
disclosed but unclaimed, and thus not regarded by the applicant as 
her invention during prosecution of the patent application.20  This 
limitation is discussed in detail in Part V infra. 
II. THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS FRUSTRATES THE NOTICE 
FUNCTION OF CLAIMS 
A.  The Patent Statute Requires That Claims Give Clear Notice to 
Competitors 
The patent statute requires that the claims of a patent 
particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[] what the applicant 
considers to be his invention.21  There are at least two reasons that 
this requirement was included in the Patent Act.  First, claims that 
particularly and distinctly define the periphery of an invention help 
focus examination and facilitate meaningful prosecution of patent 
applications to arrive at issued claims that ideally are carefully 
tailored to protect the invention as much as possible within the 
requirements of patentability.22  Indeed, the system of patent 
 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1865. 
 18 See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 24-25, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1869. 
 19 See Festo, 187 F.3d at 1382, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1960 (briefing also requested on the 
effect of the all-elements rule in this case). 
 20 See Maxwell v. J. Baker Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 21 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994). 
 22 See Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2173, 6th ed., rev. 3 (1997). 
The primary purpose of this requirement of definiteness of claim language is to 
ensure that the scope of the claims is clear so the public is informed of the 
boundaries of what constitutes infringement of the patent.  A secondary purpose 
is to provide a clear measure of what applicants regard as the invention so that it 
can be determined whether the claimed invention meets all the criteria for 
patentability and whether the specification meets the criteria of 35 U.S.C. 112, 
first paragraph, with respect to the claimed invention. 
Id. 
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procurement in the United States is based upon the notion that 
pending claims give notice to the patent examiner as to the extent 
of the patent rights sought by the applicant. 
A second and more important reason for the requirement of 
section 112 of Title 35 of the U.S.C., second paragraph, is that it 
allows competitors to discern with some certainty the scope of the 
patent rights of issued patents so that the competitors can plan their 
activities to conform with the law.23  The phrase the notice 
function is most often used to refer to this second situation, and it 
is that sense that is the subject of this paper. 
B. Clear Notice of Patent Rights to Competitors is Socially 
Desirable 
In the realm of claim construction, the courts have emphasized 
the importance of the notice function of claims.  In Markman v. 
Westview Instruments Inc.24 (hereinafter Markman I), the 
Federal Circuit sitting en banc stated: 
 It is only fair (and statutorily required) that competitors 
be able to ascertain to a reasonable degree the scope of 
the patentees right to exclude.  Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 
U.S. 568, 573-74 (1877) (It seems to us that nothing can 
be more just and fair, both to the patentee and to the 
public, than that the former should understand, and 
correctly describe, just what he has invented, and for 
what he claims a patent.).  They may understand what is 
the scope of the patent owners rights by obtaining the 
patent and prosecution historythe undisputed public 
recordand applying established rules of construction 
to the language of the patent claim in the context of the 
patent.  Moreover, competitors should be able to rest 
assured, if infringement litigation occurs, that a judge, 
trained in the law, will similarly analyze the text of the 
patent and its associated public record and apply the 
established rules of construction, and in that way arrive at 
 
 23 See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 28-29, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1871. 
 24 52 F.3d 967, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (hereinafter 
Markman I), affd, Markman v. Westview Instruments Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 38 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1461 (1996) (hereinafter Markman II). 
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the true and consistent scope of the patent owners rights 
to be given legal effect.25 
The Supreme Court echoed the same concern in Markman v. 
Westview Instruments Inc.26 (hereinafter Markman II), as one of 
the functional considerations that compels claim construction by 
the courts.27  In Markman II, Justice Souter quoted two cases for a 
similar proposition, as follows: 
 [T]he limits of a patent must be known for the protection 
of the patentee, the encouragement of the inventive 
genius of others and the assurance that the subject of the 
patent will be dedicated ultimately to the public.  
General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 
364, 369 (1938).  Otherwise, a zone of uncertainty 
which enterprise and experimentation may enter only at 
the risk of infringement [of] claims would discourage 
invention only a little less than unequivocal foreclosure 
of the field[.] United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 
317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942).28 
C. The Penumbra of Equivalents Frustrates the Notice Function 
The preceding statements by the two highest courts of patent law 
seem to have been written as if there were no doctrine of 
equivalents, because the claims alone, no matter how they are 
interpreted, do not completely define the patent owners rights 
(the phrase used in Markman I).  The patent owners rights are 
the rights to exclude others from making, using, selling, etc., what 
the claims literally cover plus their equivalents under the doctrine 
of equivalents.29  The scope of equivalents cannot be determined 
from the undisputed public record (another phrase from 
Markman I).  Furthermore, the determination of equivalence 
usually is not decided by a judge.30  Rather, equivalence is a 
 
 25 Id. at 979, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1329 (emphasis added). 
 26  517 U.S. 370, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d 1461 (1996). 
 27 Id. at 388, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1470. 
 28 Id. 
 29  See, e.g., John R. Thomas, On Preparatory Texts and Proprietary Technologies: 
The Place of Prosecution Histories in Patent Claim Interpretation, 47 UCLA L. REV. 
183, 191 (1999). 
 30  See Markman II, 517 U.S. 370, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d 1461. 
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question of fact that a jury often decides.31 
For the same reasons that claim construction should be 
predictable and certain, the scope of infringing activity should also 
be predictable and certain.  Literal infringement meets this goal.  
Indeed, there is usually little dispute regarding literal infringement 
after a claim construction is settled.32  However, the doctrine of 
equivalents takes us away from this goal.  The doctrine of 
equivalents sacrifices some certainty for the sake of equity.33  The 
doctrine of equivalents frustrates certainty on many levels, 
including legal issues and factual issues. 
There are presently legal uncertainties in the doctrine of 
equivalents,34 and satisfactory resolution of these legal 
uncertainties is unlikely.  For example, the hypothetical claim 
exercise for determining when an equivalent runs afoul of prior 
art,35 though theoretically satisfying, is awkward in practice and 
rarely invoked.36  As another example, the doctrine of prosecution 
history estoppel is gray in areas regarding patentability, other 
than patentability over prior art, as to whether voluntary 
amendments create estoppel and the range of equivalents available 
when estoppel is present.  Though these issues are unsettled at this 
time, the courts should be able to articulate certain and satisfactory 
guidelines for these aspects of prosecution history estoppel.   
However, the all-elements rule is much more troubling.  The 
definition of an element is slippery and probably cannot be 
settled without some resort to arbitrariness.  Presently, an element 
seems to be more than just a single word, but potentially less than 
an entire step in a method or an entire constituent part of an 
apparatus (as is typically demarcated by semicolons).37  It is quite 
possible that the courts will settle on a totality of circumstances 
approach for determining whether a given word or phrase is an 
 
 31 See id. 
 32 See Markman I, 52 F.3d at 989, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1337 (Mayer, J., concurring) 
([T]o decide what the claims mean is nearly always to decide the case.). 
 33 See Donald S. Chisum, The Scope of Protection for Patents After the Supreme 
Courts Warner-Jenkinson Decision: The Fair Protection - Certainty Conundrum, 14 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 7 (1998). 
 34 See Festo, 187 F.3d 1381, 1381, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d 1959, 1959 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 35 See Wilson Sporting Goods, 904 F.2d 677, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1942 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 36 John R. Thomas, Lecture at the Patent & Trademark Office (Spring 1997). 
 37 See, e.g., Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 9 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1962 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
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element or not, and such a result will add further uncertainty to 
the doctrine of equivalents.  Given that the Supreme Court has 
placed so much importance on the all-elements rule as a means for 
curtailing broad application of the doctrine of equivalents,38 
defects in the all-elements rule will propagate through to affect the 
doctrine of equivalents significantly. 
In addition to the legal uncertainties behind the doctrine of 
equivalents, there are numerous factual uncertainties in any case.  
First, under the function-way-result test for substantiality of 
differences, many possible functions, ways, and results are 
possible.  Plaintiffs invariably argue for broader functions, ways, 
and results, while defendants argue for narrower ones.39  The 
formulations of a function, way, and result become additional 
issues to litigate. 
Perhaps the biggest uncertainty regarding the doctrine of 
equivalents is that the decision can be made by a jury.40  Markman 
II confirms that the right to a jury trial is required by the Seventh 
Amendment, and that the jurys role is only to decide the ultimate 
infringement issues.41  Of course, summary judgment is possible 
when the facts are such that no reasonable jury could find against 
the weight of the evidence or when certain legal issues like the 
prior art limits, prosecution history estoppel, the all-elements rule, 
or the dedication rule preclude a finding of infringement by 
equivalents.42  In fact, there appears to be a movement towards use 
of these tools by the court (as opposed to the jury) to resolve issues 
under the doctrine of equivalents.43  Perhaps this movement is due 
to the courts (particularly the Federal Circuits) sense that greater 
predictability is needed in this area of the law. 
 
 38 See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. 17, 24-25, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1865, 1869 (1997). 
 39 See DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 1114 (1998). 
 40 See Graver Tank, 339 U.S. 605, 609, 85 U.S.P.Q. 328, 331 (1950).  See also 
Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 35-39, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1874-75. 
 41 Markman II, 517 U.S. 370, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d 1461 (1996). 
 42 See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 24-25, 39 n.8, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1869, 1876 n.8.  
See also Sage Prod. Inc. v. Devon Indus. Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1423, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d 1103, 
1106 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 43 See Peter J. Ayers, Armed and Ready: Defending Patent Infringement Claims by 
Summary Judgment, 8 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY 421, 439 (1999).  See also Jon 
D. Grossman & Eric Oliver, A Step-By-Step Guide to Prosecuting Business Method 
Patents, 17 No. 3 COMPUTER LAW. 6, 6 (March 2000) (The current trend toward liming 
the scope of equivalents (under 35 U.S.C. § 112 (¶ 6) and under the Doctrine of 
Equivalents . . . .). 
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D. Frustration of the Notice Function Due to a Far-Reaching 
Doctrine of Equivalents Causes Business Uncertainty, Stifles 
Designing Around Innovations and Breeds Litigation 
Uncertainty as to application of the doctrine of equivalents, like 
uncertainty as to claim construction, makes it more difficult for a 
competitor to determine the extent of patent rights.44  This in turn 
makes it more difficult for the competitor to plan its activities (e.g., 
negotiate for a license, expect litigation, and predict the results of 
litigation).  Patent practitioners feel the force of this uncertainty 
when they must provide an opinion as to whether a client is 
infringing a patent or not.  This uncertainty can result in a less 
efficient system of competition. 
Uncertainty as to application of the doctrine of equivalents also 
makes it less likely that a competitor will expend resources to 
design around patents,45 i.e., find ways to achieve the advantage 
of the invention or solve the problem addressed by the invention 
without infringing the patent claims.  If patent rights could be 
determined with certainty from the public record, a competitor 
might be more willing to invest in efforts to design around the 
patent rights.  However, when the patent rights are less certain, a 
competitor must take a greater risk to allocate resources in an 
attempt to design around the patent rights.  Lack of attempts to 
design around patents is undesirable for society for two reasons: 
first, designing around patents creates competition via cross 
elasticity of demand where a patent has foreclosed competition; 
second, designing around patent rights is in itself a form of 
innovation.46  The overall goal of the patent system is to encourage 
innovation and its disclosure.47  On one hand, the stronger patent 
 
 44 See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1535-36 
(Newman, J., concurring) (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 45 Cf. id. (listing four pairs of factually similar cases in which opposite 
determinations of equivalency were found, prompting the statement: It is not the 
doctrine of equivalents, but the uncertainty of its application, that causes the uncertainty 
in commercial relationships.). 
 46 See Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 828 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (We have 
often noted that one of the benefits of the patent system is the incentive it provides for 
designing around patented inventions, thus creating new innovations.).  See also 
Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 932 F.2d 1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1991) 
(Designing around patents is, in fact, one of the ways in which the patent system works 
to the advantage of the public in promoting progress in the useful arts, its constitutional 
purpose.). 
 47 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  See also Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 
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rights that accompany a more expansive doctrine of equivalents is 
an incentive to innovate.  On the other hand, stifling designing 
around activities suppresses an important source of downstream 
innovation.48 
Finally, uncertainty of any form breeds litigation.  This is 
certainly true in patent law.49  Disputes are less likely to settle in 
the face of a disputable factual question, such as whether an 
accused device or process is equivalent to a patent claim. 
 
U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (First, patent law seeks to foster and reward invention; second, it 
promotes disclosure of inventions to stimulate further innovation and to permit the public 
to practice the invention once the patent expires.). 
 48 See State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1235-36, 224 U.S.P.Q. 
418, 424 (Fed. Cir. 1985).  Cf. ROBERT A. GORMAN AND JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 24 (1999)  
[B]eyond some level copyright protection may actually be counterproductive by 
raising the cost of expression . . . Creating a new work typically involves 
borrowing or building on material from a prior body of works, as well as adding 
original expression to it.  A new work of fiction, for example, will contain the 
authors expressive contributions but also characters, situations, plot details, and 
so on, invented by previous authors.  Similarly, a new work of music may 
borrow tempo changes and chord progressions from earlier works.  The less 
extensive copyright protection is, the more an author, composer, or other creator 
can borrow from previous works without infringing copyright and thus lower, 
therefore, the costs of creating a new work.  Of course, even if copyright 
protection effectively prevented all unauthorized copying from a copyrighted 
work, authors would still copy.  But they would copy works whose copyright 
protection had run out, or they would disguise their copying, engage in costly 
searches to avoid copying protected works, or incur licensing and other 
transaction costs to obtain permission to copy such works.  The effect would be 
to raise the cost of creating new works  the cost of expression, broadly defined 
 and thus, paradoxically, perhaps lower the number of works created. 
Id. 
 49 See Scott R. Boalick, Note, The Dedication Rule and The Doctrine of Equivalents: 
A Proposal for Reconciliation, 87 GEO. L.J. 2363, 2365 n.22 (1999) (citing Richard L. 
Wynne, Jr., Patent Law: Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.: How Can 
the Federal Circuit Control the Doctrine of Equivalents Following the Supreme Courts 
Refusal to Set the Standard?, 50 OKLA. L. REV. 425, 444-45 (1997) and James R. Farrand 
& Ronald L. Johnston, Expanded Doctrine of Equivalents Extends Patents Old and New, 
14 No. 6 COMPUTER LAW 1, 9-10 (1997)). 
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III. REISSUE SHOULD BE PREFERRED OVER RESORT TO THE 
DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS BECAUSE REISSUE PRESERVES THE 
NOTICE FUNCTION OF CLAIMS 
Statutory reissue provisions allow a patentee to correct defects 
in patents in a proceeding at the PTO.50  A correctable defect is 
claiming too little in an original patent.51  However, broad 
application of the doctrine of equivalents is a disincentive for a 
patentee to pursue a reissue patent.  A patentee with literal claim 
scope that is too narrow is likely to assert the original patent while 
invoking the doctrine of equivalents, rather than making an 
application for reissue.  This is unfortunate for competitors, 
because reissue patents preserve the notice function of claims 
whereas the doctrine of equivalents does not.52  The tension  
between the doctrine of equivalents and reissue provisions has 
been recognized frequently by the courts.53 
A. Reissue Can Convert a Case of Infringement Under the 
Doctrine of Equivalents to a Case of Literal Infringement if the 
Equivalent is Disclosed but Unclaimed 
In a case where an equivalent is disclosed but unclaimed in the 
original patent, literal infringement of the original patent is not 
possible.  If the doctrine of equivalents were allowed to reach 
disclosed but unclaimed equivalents, then the patent holder could 
prevail in an infringement action under the doctrine of equivalents.  
However, reissue proceedings followed by an infringement action, 
under a theory of literal infringement of the reissued claims, may 
be an alternative in this situation.  Claims of a reissue patent, like 
all claims, must be supported by disclosure in the original 
application.54  Furthermore, claims of a reissue patent must not 
 
 50 See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1994). 
 51 See id. 
 52 See, e.g., Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 615-
16, 85 U.S.P.Q. 328, 333 (Black, J., dissenting) (1950); Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. 
Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1560 (Nies, J., dissenting) (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 53 See, e.g., Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 615-16, 85 U.S.P.Q. at 333 (Black, J., 
dissenting). 
 54 See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1994) (The provisions of this title relating to applications 
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broaden the scope of coverage in any respect unless filed within 
two years after the issuance of the original patent.55  Assertion of 
the original patent under the doctrine of equivalents does not have 
this time constraint.56 
B.  Competitors Have Notice of the Possible Scope and Extent of 
Reissue a priori as Well as Notice and Limited Participatory 
Rights in a Reissue Proceeding 
Reissue preserves the notice function of claims for several 
reasons.  First, the extent of possible reissue claims, whether 
broadened or not, is known a priori to competitors by inspection of 
the original disclosure.57  Second, the time limit for application of 
broadening reissues gives competitors certainty that broadened 
claims will not be possible after a fixed time.58  Third, an applicant 
for a reissue patent cannot recapture subject matter that was 
surrendered during prosecution of the original patent.59  Thus, 
while reissue removes some of the certainty and precision from 
original patent claims, reissue does so in a controlled manner that 
preserves predictability to a large extent. 
 
for patent shall be applicable to applications for reissue of a patent . . . .).  See also 
Application of Hay, 534 F.2d 917, 919, 189 U.S.P.Q. 790 (C.C.P.A 1976). 
 55 See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1994). 
 56 See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1560 (Nies, J., dissenting). 
 57 But cf. J. Christopher Carraway, The Uncertain Future of Enforcing Patents that 
have been Broadened Through Reissue, 8 FED. CIR. B.J. 63, 70-75 (1998) (arguing that 
reissue provisions conflict with the notice function of precise claiming during the two 
years after issuance, when claims are subject to change in a reissue proceeding). 
 58 See id. 
 59 See Ball Corp. v. United States, 729 F.2d 1429, 1436, 221 U.S.P.Q. 289, 295 (Fed. 
Cir. 1984) 
The recapture rule bars the patentee from acquiring, through reissue, claims that 
are of the same or of broader scope than those claims that were canceled from 
the original application.  On the other hand, the patentee is free to acquire, 
through reissue, claims that are narrower in scope than the canceled claims.  If 
the reissue claims are narrower than the canceled claims, yet broader than the 
original patent claims, reissue must be sought within 2 years after grant of the 
original patent. (footnotes omitted).   
Id.; see also In re Clement, 131 F.3d 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Hester Indus., Inc. v. Stein, 
Inc., 142 F.3d 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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C. Reissue Law is the Appropriate Vehicle to Compromise the 
Competing Policies at Stake 
The competing policies at play in reissue law include tolerance 
of some imperfection in original patents, fairness to competitors 
who have relied on original patent claims, and efficient operations 
of the PTO.60  For example, the two-year limit for seeking 
broadened claims is Congress choice for balancing the first two 
policy interests, and intervening rights directly concern the second.  
These competing policies are important ones that need to be 
addressed.61  Though some commentators are critical of the way 
reissue law balances these policies,62 reissue law provides the 
framework in which these policies can best be balanced.  The 
doctrine of equivalents, on the other hand, is an awkward 
framework for satisfactorily addressing these important policy 
concerns. 
IV. THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS SHOULD BE RESERVED FOR 
ONLY EQUIVALENTS THAT ARISE AFTER FILING OF THE ORIGINAL 
APPLICATION FOR PATENT 
A. Equivalents Known at the Time of Filing of the Original 
Application for Patent Can and Should be Disclosed and 
Claimed 
Equivalents known at the time of filing of an original patent 
application can be disclosed.  The terminology here deserves 
explanation.  It is not typical to refer to an equivalent at the time 
of filing.  Equivalents are the subject of infringement analysis 
long after filing.  An equivalent at the time of filing would more 
 
 60 Cf. In re Graff, 111 F.3d 874, 877, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (The 
reissue statute balances the purpose of providing the patentee with an opportunity to 
correct errors of inadequate claim scope, with the public interest in finality and certainty 
of patent rights.) (citing Wollensak v. Reiher, 115 U.S. 96, 100 (1885)). 
 61 See 35 U.S.C. § 252 (1994).  See also Seattle Box Co. v. Indus. Crating and 
Packing Inc., 756 F.2d 1574, 225 U.S.P.Q. 357 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 62 See MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 800 
(1998) (citing Martin J. Adelman & Gary L. Francione, The Doctrine of Equivalents in 
Patent Law: Questions Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 673 (1989)).  See 
also Carraway, supra note 57 at 90-91. 
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likely be referred to as a variation or alternative embodiment 
of the invention, and that is what is meant herein by the term 
equivalent in the context of the time of filing, i.e., a variation or 
alternative to the invention that would later be asserted as an 
equivalent in an infringement context.  By simply describing the 
equivalents as alternative embodiments in the original patent 
application, so long as the description conforms with the 
requirements of section 112 of Title 35 of the U.S.C., first 
paragraph, the equivalents can be claimed in the original 
application and perhaps in a later reissue patent application as well. 
As a practical matter for the patent drafter, it is good practice to 
disclose alternative embodiments liberally.  In so doing, the drafter 
is better able to generalize the various disclosed embodiments to 
arrive at a broad claim.  Disclosure of alternative embodiments 
also affords the patent prosecutor flexibility to avoid prior art cited 
by the patent examiner.  Finally, liberal disclosure is advantageous 
for defensive reasons.  When the patent issues, the disclosure 
becomes prior art (as of its filing date) that can preclude others 
from patenting what is disclosed.63  On the other hand, failure to 
disclose an alternative embodiment, if it is separately patentable, 
leaves open the possibility that another will invent the alternative 
embodiment and patent it himself. 
B. Disclosed But Unclaimed Equivalents Can and Should be 
Claimed in a Reissue Patent Under Appropriate 
Circumstances 
If an equivalent is disclosed in an original patent application, it 
can be claimed in a later reissue patent application, regardless of 
the scope of the reissue patent claims, provided the reissue 
application is filed within two years from the issuance of the 
original patent,64 and there is no attempt to recapture subject matter 
surrendered during the original prosecution.  If claiming the 
equivalent does not broaden the scope of a claim in the original 
patent, then the equivalent can be claimed in a reissue filed 
anytime during the term of the original patent.65  To maximize the  
 
 63 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) (1994). 
 64 See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1994). 
 65 See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1994). 
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opportunity for tailoring patent claims during reissue, it is 
important to obtain broad claims in the original patent. 
C. Disclosed But Unclaimed Embodiments Should be Barred 
From the Doctrine of Equivalents 
Various thoughts have emerged from the bench regarding the 
relationship between the doctrine of equivalents and disclosed but 
unclaimed embodiments of the invention.  Graver Tank & 
Manufacturing Co. v. The Linde Air Products Co.66 (hereinafter 
Graver Tank) entertained and dismissed the proposal that the 
doctrine of equivalents should be limited to only that which is 
disclosed in the patent specification.67  Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. 
Hilton Davis Chemical Co.68 (hereinafter Warner-Jenkinson) 
reiterated that dismissal.69  On the other hand, the much more 
recent case of Maxwell v. J. Baker Inc.70 (hereinafter Maxwell) 
held that an embodiment that is disclosed but unclaimed is barred 
from the doctrine of equivalents,71 although the holding of 
Maxwell has been limited by YBM Magnex v. U.S. International 
Trade Commission72 (hereinafter YBM).  It is difficult to 
reconcile Maxwell and YBM.73  The better reasoned holding is that 
of Maxwell.  Both cases are described in detail below. 
1.  Maxwell v. Baker 
In Maxwell, the patent in suit was directed at a system for 
attaching together mated pairs of shoes.  As claimed, Maxwells 
(the inventor) invention comprised an integral fastening tab having 
two parts.74  The first part of the fastening tab was secured between 
the inner sole and outer sole inside the shoe.75  The second part 
 
 66  339 U.S. 605, 85 U.S.P.Q. 328 (1950). 
 67 Id. at 609, 85 U.S.P.Q. at 330-31. 
 68  520 U.S. 17, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1865 (1997). 
 69 Id. at 37-38, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1874. 
 70  86 F.3d 1098, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 71 Id. 
 72 145 F.3d 1317, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1843 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 73 See, e.g., Boalick, supra note 49, at 2394. 
 74 See Maxwell, 86 F.3d at 1102-04, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1003-04. 
 75 See id. 
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extended vertically upward along the shoe upper.76  A filament 
extended through apertures in the second parts of the fastening tab 
in each shoe of the mated pair.77  Maxwell disclosed, but did not 
claim, that the fastening tabs could be attached by being stitched 
into a lining seam at the side or back of the shoe, rather than being 
attached between the inner and outer soles.78  Aware of Maxwells 
patent, Baker designed attachment systems just as Maxwell had 
described but not claimed, i.e., with fastening tabs stitched along 
interior seams, not fastened between the inner and outer soles.79 
The Federal Circuit held that Maxwell was not entitled to a 
range of equivalents that included the disclosed but unclaimed 
embodiment.80  In support of this holding, Judge Lourie cited the 
well-established rule that subject matter disclosed but not 
claimed in a patent application is dedicated to the public.81  The 
rationale for this rule is to prevent patent applicants from filing 
narrow claims, thereby avoiding examination, and then seeking to 
enlarge the claim scope through the doctrine of equivalents.82  This 
argument has the flavor of estoppel.  The premise of the argument 
is that a patentee should not get different treatment for her 
invention outside the PTO from that had inside the PTO.  That is, 
if a patent applicant considered her invention to be one 
embodiment and not another at the PTO, then she as a patentee 
will be held to that choice.83 
According to the court, reissue is a statutory exception to this 
well-established rule.84  Curiously, the court does not articulate 
an exception for continuing applications that claim the unclaimed 
embodiments.  Because such an exception is surely present,85 the 
term unclaimed in this context must be understood to be 
 
 76 See id. 
 77 See id. 
 78 See id. at 1106. 
 79 See id. at 1103. 
 80 See id. at 1106. 
 81 Id. at 1106 (citing Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 939 F.2d 1558, 1562-63, 19 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1500, 1504 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). 
 82 See id. 
 83 See id. 
 84 See id. 
 85 See In re Gibbs and Griffin, 437 F.2d 486, 493 n.6, 168 U.S.P.Q. 578, 584 n.6 
(C.C.P.A. 1971) (A modicum of thought will demonstrate, as can be seen from the cases 
we are discussing herein, that the public does not necessarily get free use of an invention 
merely because in a particular patent it is disclosed and not claimed.  It may be and often 
is claimed in another patent.). 
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unclaimed at all, not just unclaimed in the individual patent in suit.  
Claiming an alternative embodiment in a continuing application 
avoids the reach of the rule.  This result is consistent with the 
rationale of the rule, because the filing of multiple applications to 
claim multiple embodiments does not signal that the applicant 
regards only limited embodiments to be her invention. 
Maxwell explains why Graver Tank is consistent with the rule 
that disclosed but unclaimed embodiments cannot be equivalents.86  
In Graver Tank, the accused composition, a welding flux 
comprising manganese silicate, was disclosed in the patent in suit87 
(the 960 patent) but not within the literal scope of the disputed 
claims, which required an alkaline earth metal silicate (which 
manganese silicate is not).88  The Court found infringement under 
the doctrine of equivalents in Graver Tank and, in doing so, gave 
weight to the findings in the record that prior art to the 960 patent 
disclosed the use of manganese silicate in welding fluxes.89  The 
Federal Circuit in Maxwell distinguished the facts before it over 
Graver Tank by noting that the 960 patent in Graver Tank 
contained broader claims than those at issue on appeal.90  The 
broader claims read on welding fluxes containing manganese 
silicates, but the broader claims were earlier held invalid as 
embracing many inoperative cases.91  Thus, the equivalent was 
claimed, though not validly, and even invalid claims are 
sufficient to escape the well-established rule that bars equivalents 
extending to disclosed but unclaimed subject matter.92  Focusing 
the rule on issued claims, rather than valid claims, is consistent 
with the rationale of the rule.  Issued claims, even if later held 
invalid, are fully examined by the PTO and represent what the 
applicant regards as her invention. 
 
 86 See Maxwell, 86 F.3d 1098, 1107-08, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001, 1006-07 (Fed. Cir. 
1996). 
 87 U.S. Patent 2,043,960. 
 88 Graver Tank, 339 U.S. 605, 610, 85 U.S.P.Q. 328, 331 (1950). 
 89 See id. 
 90  See Maxwell, 86 F.3d at 1107-08, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1006-07. 
 91 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod., Inc., 336 U.S. 271, 277, 80 U.S.P.Q. 
451, 453 (1949), affd, 339 U.S. at 607, 85 U.S.P.Q. at 328. 
 92 See Maxwell, 86 F.3d at 1107, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1007. 
PHILLIPS.FINAL 12/28/00  7:08 PM 
2000] TAKING A STEP BEYOND MAXWELL 173 
 
 
 
2. YBM Magnex v. International Trade Commission 
The well-established rule invoked in Maxwell was limited by a 
totally diverse panel of the Federal Circuit in YBM.93  In YBM, the 
patentee asserted U.S. Patent 4,588,439 (the 439 patent), which 
was directed to a permanent magnet alloy containing various 
specified elements including oxygen.94  The 439 patent claimed a 
magnet alloy with oxygen content in the range of 6,000-35,000 
ppm (parts per million).95  However, the 439 patent disclosed a 
wider range of oxygen content, including a lower range of 5,400-
6,000 ppm, where the accused alloy lay.96  An administrative law 
judge (ALJ) at the International Trade Commission (the 
Commission) found that the accused alloy infringed the 439 
patent claims under the doctrine of equivalents.97  However, the 
Commission, relying on Maxwell, reversed the ALJs 
determination.98  The Federal Circuit panel then reversed the 
Commission.99 
In reversing the Commission, the Federal Circuit panel 
explained that the well-established rule of Maxwell must be 
limited to distinct embodiments to accord with Supreme Court 
precedent in Graver Tank and Warner-Jenkinson.100  To support its 
view, the YBM panel refers to two facets of the Graver Tank case.  
First, the YBM panel notes that the district court in the Graver 
Tank litigation used the disclosure of manganese silicate as 
supporting its conclusion of equivalents.101  Second, the YBM 
panel notes that dissenters on the Supreme Court advocated a rule 
that unclaimed disclosure is dedicated to the public, yet the 
majority failed to adopt such a rule.102  To further support its view, 
 
 93 See YBM Magnex, 145 F.3d 1317, 1320-22, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1843, 1845-7 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998). 
 94 See id. at 1318. 
 95 See id. 
 96 See id. at 1319. 
 97 See id. 
 98 See id. at 1320. 
 99 See id. at 1322. 
 100 See id. at 1321. 
 101 See id. at 1320. 
 102 See id. at 1321. 
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the YBM panel refers to Warner-Jenkinson, in which the Court 
rejected the . . . proposition that equivalents . . . must be 
disclosed.103 
The YBM courts analysis of Supreme Court precedent is 
unconvincing.  With respect to the first facet of Graver Tank cited 
by the YBM panel, the Supreme Court majority in Graver Tank 
never refers to the fact that the specification of the 960 patent 
discloses the unclaimed manganese silicate ingredient.  Although 
the trial court relied upon the disclosure, the majority noted other 
evidence in upholding the trial courts finding of equivalents.104  
Thus, Graver Tank cannot properly be cited as Supreme Court 
precedent for the proposition that disclosure of a feature weighs in 
favor of finding that feature to be within the scope of equivalents 
to the claims. 
With respect to the YBM courts reference to the dissents 
positions in Graver Tank, that everything disclosed but unclaimed 
in the patent is dedicated to the public, it is improper to say that the 
Supreme Court rejected this argument.  The Court simply failed to 
apply the rule in this case.  The dissent notes that such a rule is 
required by precedent.105  As explained in Maxwell, the facts of 
Graver Tank did not implicate the rule because the equivalent at 
issue was in fact claimed.106 
3. Legal Analysis of Precedent Leading up to Maxwell and 
YBM is Not Conclusive 
Because the holdings of Maxwell and YBM are difficult to 
reconcile on their faces, it is worthwhile to examine precedent 
addressing the dedication rule.  Supreme Court precedent in this 
area is scant.  The earliest case is Miller v. Brass Co.107 
(hereinafter Miller).  The patent at issue in Miller was a reissue 
 
 103 Id. (quoting Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1865, 1874 (1997)). 
 104 Graver Tank, 339 U.S. 605, 610-11, 85 U.S.P.Q. 328, 331 (1950) (stating that use 
of expert testimony, learned treatises and prior art was [p]articularly important). 
 105 See id. at 614 (Black, J., dissenting) (citing Miller v. Brass Co., 104 U.S. 350, 352 
(1881); Marconi Wireless Co. v. United States, 57 U.S.P.Q. 471, 481 (1943)).  See also 
id. at 618 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing Mahn v. Harwood, 112 U.S. 354, 361 (1884)). 
 106 Maxwell v. J. Baker Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1107-08, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001, 1006-07 
(Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 107 104 U.S. 350 (1881). 
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patent that claimed a single dome combustion lamp with a 
chimney.108  The original patent, which had been granted fifteen 
years before the reissue patent, had claimed a double-dome 
combustion lamp without a chimney and described the invention as 
an advance over the prior art because a chimney was not needed.109  
The Court invalidated the reissue patent and in so doing articulated 
the dedication rule: [T]he claim of a specific device or 
combination, and an omission to claim other devices or 
combinations apparent on the face of the patent, are, in law, a 
dedication to the public of that which is not claimed.110  The 
Court justified the dedication rule on the grounds that laches 
should bar enlargement of claim scope after two years.111  This 
requirement was subsequently codified.112 
The Miller Court also seems to criticize the adequacy of the 
disclosure in the original patent with respect to the reissue claims, 
stating the invention specified in the . . . reissued patent . . . is not 
the same invention which was described and claimed in the 
original patent.113  This statement suggests that the reissue patent 
claimed new matter not adequately described in the original patent 
disclosure.  If true, then the dedication rule would be dictum in 
Miller. 
Subsequent cases cite Miller in two divergent ways.  In the first 
line of cases, Miller is cited for the general dedication rule under 
various circumstances.  These circumstances include the same 
reissue context, as reaffirmed in Mahn v. Harwood114 (hereinafter 
Mahn) (We deem it proper, therefore, to say, once for all, that 
the views announced in Miller v. The Brass Company on the 
subject of reissuing patents for the purpose of expanding and 
enlarging the claim, were deliberately expressed and are still 
adhered to.).115  Another circumstance in which the dedication 
rule has been invoked is claim construction.116  Finally, the 
 
 108 Id. at 351. 
 109 See id. 
 110 Id. at 352. 
 111 See id. 
 112 See 35 U.S.C. § 251. 
 113 Miller, 104 U.S. at 351 (emphasis added). 
 114  112 U.S. 354 (1884). 
 115 Id. at 358. 
 116 See Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 939 F.2d 1558, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1500, 1504 
(Fed. Cir. 1991). 
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dedication rule has been applied as a limit to the doctrine of 
equivalents.117 
Brunswick Corp. v. United States118 (hereinafter Brunswick) is 
a case in the last category.  In Brunswick, the claims at issue were 
directed at a radar camouflage screen and a recited resistivity 
between . . .100 ohms and . . .1000 ohms but considerably 
different from 377 ohms.119  The accused radar screens had a 
resistivity between 74 and 87 ohms.120  The patent specification 
contained a table disclosing the accused range.121  The Brunswick 
majority applied Maxwell directly,122 and Judge Newman wrote a 
dissent that previewed almost exactly her majority opinion in 
YBM.123  Both Brunswick and YBM involved numerical ranges and 
are extremely difficult to reconcile,124 except for the fact that 
Brunswick is non-precedential.  YBM, as noted above, attempts to 
draw a distinction on the basis of whether the disclosed but 
unclaimed subject matter is a distinct embodiment from what is 
claimed.125 
Another line of cases emphasizes the fact that Miller involved an 
inadequate disclosure.  In Application of Hay,126 an applicant for a 
reissue patent sought to introduce new matter into the reissue 
patent application so as to satisfy the best mode requirement.127  
The court held that traditional notions of new matter apply to 
reissue applications.128  The court distinguished Miller, noting that 
in Miller, the reissue corrected or clarified matter which had 
already been disclosed but in a defective fashion.129  Similarly, 
YBM cites Miller as a case in which the original patent did not 
 
 117 See, e.g., Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001 (1996); Brunswick Corp. 
v. United States, 152 F.3d 946 (table), 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1446, 1449-50, 1998 WL 163700, 
at *4 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (unpublished opinion). 
 118 Brunswick, 152 F.3d 946 (table), 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1446. 
 119 Brunswick, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1448. 
 120 See id. at 1449. 
 121 See id. at 1450. 
 122 See id. 
 123 See id. at 1454. 
 124 See Boalick, supra note 49 at 2394. 
 125 See YBM Magnex, Inc. v. Intl Trade Commn, 145 F.3d 1317, 1321, 46 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1843, 1846 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 126  534 F.2d 917, 189 U.S.P.Q. 790 (C.C.P.A 1976). 
 127 Id. at 918-19, 189 U.S.P.Q. at 791. 
 128 See id. at 919. 
 129 Id. at 920. 
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describe the subject matter for which reissue was sought.130  
Under this view, Miller disclosed too little rather than too much. 
Whatever view of Miller is taken, Mahn is Supreme Court 
precedent in support of the dedication rule in a reissue context.131  
Given that the dedication rule exists as a sound proposition of law 
in at least the reissue context, and perhaps claim construction, the 
issue is whether it rightfully extends to the doctrine of equivalents.  
An argument in support of this extension can be based on the 
rationale for the dedication rule.  The primary rationale for the 
dedication rule is that patentees should not be able to assert patent 
rights broader than what the PTO examined, when there was an 
opportunity to obtain examination of claims covering the asserted 
rights.132  Another rationale is public notification.133  Both 
rationales support extension of the dedication rule to the doctrine 
of equivalents.134 
However, there exists precedent for allowing patentees to apply 
the doctrine of equivalents to reach disclosed but unclaimed 
subject matter.  As pointed out in YBM, these cases include 
Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp.135 (hereinafter Uniroyal), 
Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Shandon, Inc.136 (hereinafter Miles 
Labs), Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc.137 (hereinafter 
Pall), and Modine Manufacturing Co. v. U.S. International 
Trade Commission138 (hereinafter Modine).  In Uniroyal, the 
 
 130 YBM Magnex, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1847.  Cf. Mark V. Hurwitz, YBM Magnex, Inc. 
v. International Trade Commission, 14 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 191, 191-92 (1999) 
(proposing that the presence of disclosed but unclaimed matter should bar the 
availability of the doctrine of equivalents . . . only when, as in Miller, the patentee 
explicitly distinguishes his invention from the disclosed but unclaimed matter). 
 131 See Mahn, 112 U.S. 354 (1884). 
 132 See Maxwell, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001.  See also Intl Visual Corp. v. Crown Metal 
Mfg. Co., 991 F.2d 768, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1588, 1593 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Lourie, J., 
concurring); Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Found., Ltd., 29 F.3d 1555, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1161, 1167-68 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing North Am. Vaccine, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 7 
F.3d, 1571, 1577, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (However, North American 
Vaccine does not support the proposition for which Genentech cites it.  North American 
Vaccine states in the context of claim construction that claims should not be construed to 
cover what is neither disclosed nor enabled.)); Unique Concepts, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1504; 
Boalick, supra note 49, at 2382. 
 133 See Mahn, 112 U.S. at 361. 
 134 See Boalick, supra note 49, at 2382, 2384. 
 135 939 F.2d 1540, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 136 997 F.2d 870, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 137 66 F.3d 1211, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d 1225 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 138 75 F.3d 1545, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d 1609 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
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claim at issue recited a specific numerical value of approximately 
0.7,139 but the specification disclosed a broader range of 0.5 to 
0.9.140  The Uniroyal court upheld a finding of infringement under 
the doctrine of equivalents of an accused device while citing the 
patents disclosure of the broader range as supporting the finding 
of equivalence.141  In Miles Labs, the claims at issue recited a 
single cabinet,142 while the accused device consisted of three 
cabinets.143  However, the patent specification mentioned that 
separate cabinets could be used,144 and the Miles Labs court 
upheld a finding of infringement under the doctrine of 
equivalents.145 
Modine is another case involving numerical ranges.  In Modine, 
the claims recited a relatively small hydraulic diameter.146  A 
parent application to the patent at issue disclosed a preferred 
hydraulic diameter of 0.015 - 0.070 inches and the patent disclosed 
a graph showing this broader range; however, the claim at issue 
narrowed this range to 0.015 - 0.040 inches.147  The patent also 
incorporated by reference a document disclosing a hydraulic 
diameter up to 0.07 inches.148  The accused devices had hydraulic 
diameters in the range 0.040 - 0.070 inches, i.e., outside the literal 
claimed range but within the disclosed range.149  The patentee 
argued that the disclosure supports a range of equivalents up to 
0.070 inches.150  Without directly answering this argument, the 
Federal Circuit held that the patentee was estopped from asserting 
a range of equivalents having a hydraulic diameter above 0.04822 
inches, due to amendments to avoid prior art.151  The Federal 
Circuit remanded the case for determination of infringement by 
equivalency within the permissible range of equivalents.152 
 
 139 Uniroyal, 939 F.2d at 1544. 
 140 Id. at 1544 n.3. 
 141 See id. at 1544. 
 142 Miles Lab., 997 F.2d at 876. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. at 877. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Modine, 75 F.3d at 1549. 
 147 See id. at 1552. 
 148 See id. at 1553. 
 149 See id. at 1554. 
 150  See Modine, 75 F.3d at 1551. 
 151 See id. at 1551-52, 1556. 
 152 See id. at 1556. 
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Unlike the three cases just discussed, Pall does not support the 
proposition for which YBM cites it.  In Pall, the claim recited a 
numerical range of about 5:1 to about 7:1,153 while the numerical 
value in the accused device was 4:1.154  A first-filed patent 
specification broadly described the invention without numerical 
limits; however, a subsequent continuation-in-part application 
added the range limitation in the claims after the inventor 
conducted additional research and determined, to the best of his 
knowledge, that the invention was operable only in the claimed 
range.155 Thus, the alleged equivalent numerical value of 4:1 was 
neither disclosed nor enabled in the patent at issue.  Although there 
was infringement under the doctrine of equivalents in Pall, it is not 
a case where the claims were narrower than the disclosure, as YBM 
states.  In fact, Pall is a case where the equivalent resulted from 
after-arising technology, as developments subsequent to the patent 
filing made commercially available material having the numerical 
value of 4:1.156 
Setting aside the Pall decision, Uniroyal, Miles Labs and 
Modine are three examples where the doctrine of equivalents was 
allowed without restraint by the dedication rule.  However, none of 
the defendants in these cases raised a challenge under the 
dedication rule.  The courts in these cases did not raise the 
dedication rule sue sponte, but one wonders if the outcomes would 
have been different had the defendants raised the dedication rule.  
In the absence of a direct challenge, it is difficult to say that these 
cases test the limits of the dedication rule. 
In summary, both Maxwell and YBM find some support in 
precedent.  Because YBM was decided by a panel, Maxwell, as the 
earlier decided case, is binding to the extent that the two cases are 
in conflict.157  However, YBM arguably limits Maxwell rather than 
conflicts with Maxwell.  The limitation is that only distinct 
embodiments that are disclosed but unclaimed are dedicated 
subject matter. 
 
 153 Pall, 66 F.3d at 1217. 
 154 Id. 
 155 See id. at 1219. 
 156 See id. 
 157 See, e.g., Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.2d 1279, 1281 (Fed. 
Cir. 1992) ([W]here there are conflicting precedents, the earlier precedent controls.). 
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4. As a Normative Matter, the Dedication Rule Should Not be 
Limited to Distinct Embodiments 
YBM, though technically defendable under precedent, attempts 
to draw a distinction that is dangerous.  It is not clear what makes 
an embodiment distinct.  The only guidance on this point from 
the YBM opinion is that systems for attaching together mated pairs 
are distinct when the attachment tags connect to different parts of 
the shoe, but that different numerical ranges are not distinct.158  
This line of reasoning has the potential of disparate impacts on 
different fields of technology.  This line of reasoning may render 
mechanical variations, in general, as being more often viewed as 
distinct embodiments, but chemical variations, which are often 
numerical ranges in a composition, as not being distinct 
embodiments.  The issue of whether a given alternative is distinct 
or not will undoubtedly become a contested issue in many future 
cases, if the distinctiveness distinction is allowed to stand. 
Because Maxwell is better supported by direct precedent and its 
rationale, and because YBMs distinctiveness criterion is likely too 
difficult to apply without considerable arbitrariness, the courts or 
Congress should overrule YBM and reaffirm as a bright line rule 
that disclosed but unclaimed features of the invention, whether 
distinct or not, are barred from the doctrine of equivalents. 
D. Proposal: Only in the Case Where an Equivalent Could Not 
Possibly Have Been Disclosed in the Original Application for 
Patent is the Extra Protection of the Doctrine of Equivalents a 
Sound Policy 
Taking one step beyond the recommendation above would 
resolve much of the dissatisfaction with the doctrine of 
equivalents.  The needed additional step is to impute to a patent 
applicant knowledge of the prior art for the purpose of determining 
what she regards as her invention.  That is, the dedication rule 
applied in Maxwell should be broadened to bar from equivalents 
unclaimed features that were disclosed or could have been 
disclosed by virtue of being known in the art at the time of 
 
 158 See YBM Magnex, Inc. v. Intl Trade Commn, 145 F.3d 1317, 1320, 46 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1843, 1846 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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filing.159  Put another way, the doctrine of equivalents should be 
barred from reaching all but later arising equivalents. 
This proposal would have many benefits to the patent system.  In 
particular, the proposal would reinvigorate the notice function of 
claims, attenuate difficulties with the doctrine of equivalents, 
encourage liberal disclosure by patentees, make reissue 
proceedings more important in patent enforcement, and preserve 
for pioneer inventions a deservedly larger range of equivalents.  
These and other points are discussed in the following subsections. 
1. The Proposal Would Reinvigorate the Notice Function of 
Claims 
Limiting the doctrine of equivalents to after-arising equivalents 
would strengthen the notice function of claims.  The scope and 
content of both the disclosure and the prior art to the patent can be 
objectively determined by a competitor.  The disclosure is a matter 
of public record.  The prior art to the patent is fixed and can be 
investigated to whatever extent a competitor is willing to expend 
resources to do so.  The prior art that is presumptively most 
relevant is, in fact, a part of the public record of the patent.160  
Although cases would arise in which a jury would decide a factual 
question about the scope and content of the prior art, that is exactly 
an issue that is regularly determined in anticipation and 
obviousness disputes, and, consequently, one that the courts and 
the bar are accustomed to handling.161 
Given the disclosure and the scope and content of the prior art, it 
is straightforward to determine whether an accused equivalent is 
one that arises after the patent filing or not.  The bar against all but 
later rising equivalents would be the judicial tool of first resort to 
prevent overreaching of the doctrine of equivalents.  Because 
 
 159 Cf. Jason Schultz, Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Industries, 
Inc. & Dawn Equipment Co. v. Kentucky Farms, Inc., 14 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 173, 189 
(1999) (proposing a more flexible and equitable reason to know standard rather than 
simple existence in the context of the contemporary technology rule for the doctrine of 
equivalents for claim elements in means-plus-function form). 
 160 See The Honorable Paul R. Michel and Lisa Schneider, Side Bar: Vitronics  Some 
Unanswered Questions in CHISUM, supra note 39, at 1101.  Cf. Vitronics Corp. v. 
Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582-83, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 161 See Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 17, 148 USPQ 459 (1966) (Under § 103, 
the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined.). 
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fewer issues of equivalents would get over this bar, the precise 
language of the claims would take on greater significance.  
Competitors could rely on the precise language of the claims 
except in relatively well-defined cases of after-arising technology. 
2. The Proposal Would Attenuate the Confusing Legal 
Morass Surrounding the Doctrine of Equivalents, Thus 
Providing for More Efficient Resolution of Patent Disputes 
Because the bar against all but later rising equivalents would be 
a significant gatekeeper to the doctrine of equivalents, the 
significance of related doctrines such as prosecution history 
estoppel, prior art limitations and the all-elements rule would be 
diminished.  First, these related doctrines would simply be 
implicated less often  only when the equivalents are after-arising.  
Prosecution history estoppel would rarely be applicable to after-
arising technology, because prosecution history often involves 
amendments and remarks concerning the prior art and patentability 
over the prior art.  Furthermore, prior art limitations would 
probably never be relevant in cases of after-arising limitation.  The 
all-elements rule, on the other hand, would be equally relevant 
regardless of whether the equivalent is old or new. 
3. The Proposal Would Appropriately Encourage Liberal 
Disclosure in Original Patent Applications 
One of the fundamental policies animating the patent laws is the 
importance of disclosure of technology.162  A defect in the 
dedication rule from Maxwell is that it discourages disclosure.  The 
proposal to bar everything known at the time of filing a patent 
application cures this defect.  Under the proposal, failure to 
disclose what is known in the art at the time of filing would not 
save a patentee from the bar against equivalents.  To the contrary, 
the proposal would encourage patent drafters to cover with claims 
as many features from the prior art that can be combined with core 
patentable elements of the invention.  To support such claims, 
broad disclosure would be needed. 
 
 162 See, e.g., CHISUM, supra note 39, at 1 (citing DONALD S. CHISUM AND MICHAEL 
JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1-2 n.1 (1992)). 
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Furthermore, because the proposal would place more importance 
on reissue of patents, as discussed below, the proposal would make 
it more prudent for patent drafters to include generous disclosure 
of optional and alternative features of the invention to provide 
support for claims to those features in a reissue patent.  Of course, 
disclosure to most prior art technology can be easily and succinctly 
accomplished by the technique of incorporation by reference.163 
4. The Proposal Would Make Reissue Proceedings More 
Important in Patent Enforcement 
Reissue patents would take on a greater importance because 
defective claims (i.e., ones that are literally too narrow) could not 
be expanded by the doctrine of equivalents unless the equivalent 
was after-arising.  In all other cases where the literal scope of 
claims is inadequate, reissue proceedings would be necessary for 
enforcement of a broadened patent right.  Perhaps as a result of the 
proposals de-emphasis of the doctrine of equivalents and 
corresponding added emphasis on reissue, the two year time limit 
for seeking broadened reissue claims should be extended.  
Congress can determine the appropriate time limit by balancing the 
equitable interests of patent holders and competitors at risk of 
infringement. 
5. The Proposal Would Provide Pioneer Inventions with a 
Deservedly Larger Range of Equivalents 
Pioneer inventions are generally thought of as those inventions 
that have been preceded by very little prior art.164  Because pioneer 
inventions represent relatively large leaps in technological 
progress, courts have been willing to afford them greater 
protection.165  Of course, the shortage of prior art to a pioneer 
invention makes possible claims having broad literal scope.  
Notwithstanding broad literal claim scope, courts have been 
 
 163 See generally Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 608.01(p), 7th ed. (1998). 
 164 See, e.g., Harold C. Wegner et al., The Future of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 26 
AIPLA Q.J. 277, 323 (1998) (citing John R. Thomas, The Question Concerning Patent 
Law and Pioneer Inventions, 10 HIGH TECH L.J. 35 (1995)). 
 165 See, e.g., Shields v. Halliburton Co., 667 F.2d 1232, 216 U.S.P.Q. 1066 (5th Cir. 
1982); John Zinck Co. v. Natl Airoil Burner Co., 196 U.S.P.Q. 554 (S.D. Tex. 1977). 
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willing to allow broad play in the doctrine of equivalents for 
pioneer inventions.166  Prior art limitations to the doctrine of 
equivalents certainly do not restrain the scope of equivalents for a 
pioneer invention.  The proposal to limit the doctrine of 
equivalents to after-arising equivalents would limit equivalents for 
pioneer inventions very little, if at all, because almost all 
technology related to a pioneer invention is after-arising. 
6. The Proposal Would Harmonize Doctrine of Equivalents 
Analysis Whether or Not Means-Plus-Function Claiming is 
Utilized 
When an element of a claim is recited in means-plus-function 
form, a type of equivalents (structural equivalents) is included 
within the literal scope of the claim.167  Structural equivalents 
differ from equivalents under the doctrine of equivalents (DOE) 
in that structural equivalents must perform an identical function,168 
whereas a DOE equivalent need only perform a function that is 
substantially the same.169  A structural equivalent also must be 
available at the time of issuance,170 whereas a DOE equivalent can 
result from after-arising technology.171  Thus, when there is no 
literal infringement of a means-plus-function claim and the 
similarity of function is not at issue, the doctrine of equivalents is 
limited to only after-arising technology,172 much like the extended 
dedication rule proposed here. 
 
 
 166 See, e.g., Shields, 667 F.2d at 1238, 216 U.S.P.Q. at 1071 ([A] pioneer patent [is] 
entitled to a liberal range of equivalents.); John Zinck, 196 U.S.P.Q. at 558 ([The] 
patent qualifies as a pioneer patent. . . . A liberal construction of the breadth of the 
patents scope is, therefore, appropriate under the doctrine of equivalents.). 
 167 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994). 
 168 See Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Intl, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1321, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, 
1168 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., 
Inc., 145 F.3d 1303, 1310, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1752 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
 169 See id. 174 F.3d at 1321, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1168 (citing Cybor Corp. v. FAS Tech., 
Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) and Hughes Aircraft Co. v. U.S., 
140 F.3d 1470, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
 170 See id. (citing Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145 
F.3d 1303, 1310, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1752 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 171 See id. 
 172 See Chiuminatta, 145 F.3d 1303, 1310. 
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7. The Proposal is Consistent with the Rule that Equivalents 
are Determined at the Time of Infringement 
Equivalents are determined at the time of infringement.173  The 
proposal is consistent with this rule.  After-arising equivalents, by 
definition, are known at the time of infringement but not 
necessarily any sooner.  In stating this rule, Warner-Jenkinson 
explicitly set forth that after-arising equivalents should be within 
the scope of available equivalents, subject to the other pertinent 
limitations.174 
8. The Proposal Rightfully Encourages Careful Drafting of 
Patent Applications 
A disadvantage of the proposal is that it places a greater 
importance on patent drafting and, consequently, higher costs on 
patent drafting, because the patent drafter must be careful to claim 
and disclose as much as possible.175  This raises concern that 
patenting, which is already expensive, may become unaffordable 
for applicants with limited funding, such as some individual 
unaffiliated inventors and very small companies.  This concern was 
recently addressed by the Federal Circuit: 
[A]s between the patentee who had a clear opportunity to 
negotiate broader claims but did not do so, and the public 
at large, it is the patentee who must bear the cost of its 
failure to seek protection for this foreseeable alteration of 
its claimed structure. [citations omitted]  This court 
recognizes that such reasoning places a premium on 
forethought in patent drafting.  Indeed this premium may 
lead to higher costs of patent prosecution.  However, the 
alternative rule  allowing broad play for the doctrine of 
equivalents to encompass foreseeable variations, not just 
of a claim element, but of a patent claim  also leads to 
higher costs.  Society at large would bear these latter 
costs in the form of virtual foreclosure of competitive 
activity within the penumbra of each issued patent claim.  
 
 173 See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 37, 41 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1865, 1874 (1997). 
 174 See id. 
 175 See Schultz, supra note 159, at 189 (discussing equivalents searches). 
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Because the doctrine of equivalents blurs the line of 
demarcation between infringing and non-infringing 
activity, it creates a zone of uncertainty, into which 
competitors tread only at their peril. [citation omitted]  
Given a choice of imposing the higher costs of careful 
prosecution on patentees, or imposing the costs of 
foreclosed business activity on the public at large, this 
court believes the costs are properly imposed on the 
group best positioned to determine whether or not a 
particular invention warrants investment at a higher 
level, that is the patentees.176 
V. OTHER ATTEMPTS TO REACH THE SAME RESULT HAVE FAILED 
The proposal to limit the doctrine of equivalents to after-arising 
technology is not new.177  The proposal has been made before with 
a justification based on similarities with structural equivalents of 
means-plus-function claim elements.178  As noted in section 6 of 
Part IV, supra, DOE equivalents are sometimes limited to after-
arising technology for claim elements in means-plus-function 
form.  In Kraft Foods, Inc. v. International Trading Co., the 
accused infringer tried to extend this rule to non-means-plus 
function elements.179  However, the Federal Circuit declined, 
explicitly stating that infringement under the doctrine of 
equivalents is not limited to technology arising after the issuance 
of the patent.180 
This attempt was properly rejected.  The rule that DOE 
equivalents in a means-plus-function claim are sometimes limited 
to after-arising technology is based on judicial economy.181  
 
 176 Sage Products, 126 F.3d 1420, 1425, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d 1103, 1107-08 (emphasis 
added). 
 177 See, e.g., Kraft Foods, Inc. v. Intl Trading Co., 203 F.3d 1362, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 
2000). 
 178 See id. 
 179 See id. 
 180 Id. at 1371 (citing Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 140 F.3d 1449, 1464-65, 46 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1321, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (rejecting argument that doctrine of equivalents 
should be limited to after-arising equivalents, since known interchangeability is often 
synonymous with equivalence)). 
 181 See Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145 F.3d 1303, 
1311 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ([W]hy should the issue of equivalence have to be litigated a 
second time?). 
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Because an analysis of structural equivalents for an element of a 
means-plus-function claim always precedes an analysis of DOE 
equivalents, and because the analysis of structural equivalents 
considers everything possibly equivalent up to the time of grant, 
then consideration of DOE equivalents from the same time period 
(assuming identical functions) would give the patentee two bites 
at the apple.182  This rationale is simply not present when the 
claim is not in means-plus-function form.  That is, the concern of 
Chiuminatta Concrete is not a reason to limit the doctrine of 
equivalents to after-arising technology generally.  Rather, the more 
encompassing policy concerns listed in Part IV, supra, are 
appropriate reasons to limit the doctrine of equivalents to after-
arising technology generally.183 
CONCLUSION 
The doctrine of equivalents will be tamed one way or another.  
The major battle over the doctrine was fought in Warner-
Jenkinson, and the doctrine survived.  Still, the doctrines friction 
with the notice function of precise claiming remains, and reissue 
proceedings are underutilized.  Under the current paradigm, 
attempts to tame the doctrine of equivalents take the forms of the 
arbitrary all-elements rule, the much maligned doctrine of 
prosecution history estoppel, and the awkward analysis of 
hypothetical claims compared to prior art.  A reinvigorated and 
augmented dedication rule offers a better approach.  First, YBM 
should be expressly overruled, so that the dedication rule would 
apply regardless of whether the disclosed but unclaimed aspects of 
the invention are distinct from the claimed aspects.  Otherwise, the 
dedication rule is likely to take an undesirable arbitrary quality.  
Second, and more importantly, the dedication rule should be 
extended to aspects of the invention that could have been disclosed 
at the time of filing.  The first step can be taken by an en banc 
Federal Circuit to resolve conflicting precedent.  The second step 
is best taken by Congress, because it treads where there is no 
 
 182 Kraft Foods, 203 F.3d at 1372, 1373 (quoting Chiuminatta, 145 F.3d at 1311). 
 183 These concerns are: (1) the notice function of claims; (2) legal uncertainties 
surrounding the doctrine of equivalents; (3) encouragement of liberal disclosure; (4) 
proper utilization of reissue proceedings; (5) protection of pioneer inventions; (6) 
harmonization with means-plus-function style claiming; (7) determination of equivalence 
at the time of infringement; and (8) having the cost borne by patent applicants. 
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precedent.  The result of this approach would be a doctrine of 
equivalents that is available only for equivalents resulting from 
after-arising technology.  This result would benefit the patent 
system in a number of ways, including preservation of much of the 
notice function of claims, added importance to reissue law, 
encouragement of liberal disclosure by patent applicants, a 
deservedly greater range of equivalents for pioneer inventions, and 
a harmonious doctrine of equivalents whether or not means-plus-
function claiming is present. 
 
